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THE SEARCH FOR HERCULES: RESIDUAL 
OWNERS, DIRECTORS, AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN CHAPTER 11 
ROBERT K. RASMUSSEN* 
The Myth of the Residual Owner1 is vintage Lynn LoPucki. Befitting 
the leading empirical scholar on the Chapter 11 proceedings of large, 
publicly held companies, the piece rigorously exposes under-appreciated 
aspects of modern Chapter 11 practice. Myth enriches our understanding 
of reorganization practice by replacing the standard characterization of a 
business’s capital structure as consisting of secured debt, unsecured debt, 
and equity with a pattern that reveals a more complex priority structure.2 
Rather than a single class of unsecured creditors lodged firmly between 
secured creditors on the top and equity holders on the bottom, LoPucki 
finds a plethora of classes, with a median number above three and some 
businesses having as many as thirteen.3  
Which classes actually see money at the end of the day is more 
important than how many classes are seeking funds. A central function of 
a bankruptcy proceeding is dividing up the pie. The number of priority 
classes, just like the number of claims, provides an incomplete and often 
misleading picture of the reorganization process. What matters is money. 
LoPucki enlightens us along this dimension as well. In most cases, at least 
the most senior group of unsecured creditors is paid in full.4 They get what 
they contracted for. More surprisingly, however, is that there is often more 
than one group that gets partial payment. In over half of the cases in his 
sample, two or more groups of unsecured creditors received partial 
payment.5 
These results are interesting in and of themselves. LoPucki’s data 
demonstrate that priority need not be tied to the institution of secured 
credit; contracts that establish priority are quite effective.6 In some cases, 
 * Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. The thoughts in this response grow out of my 
long, fruitful, and continuing collaboration with my colleague Douglas Baird. I would like to thank 
Lynn LoPucki for his generous sharing of his data, his sharing of his time as I worked with his 
database, and his comments on an earlier draft of this response. 
 1. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1341 (2005). 
 2. Id. at 1356. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. at 1363 n.69. 
 5. Id. at 1361. 
 6. Id. at 1353. 
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one group may hold investments that are expressly subordinated to other 
investments. In other cases, lenders can create priority among unsecured 
debt through careful attention to which entities incur which debts. The fact 
that corporate structure can itself create priority is one that is too often 
overlooked in bankruptcy scholarship.7 If anything, LoPucki understates 
the extent to which structural priority occurs in modern lending markets. 
LoPucki, however, is not content with only making an empirical 
observation. In addition, he seeks to use these findings to construct a case 
for a particular governance structure for the enterprise while it is in 
Chapter 11.8 LoPucki undertook his search for the residual owner in an 
attempt to shake the faith of those who believe that the fate of financially 
distressed firms is best determined by those with their money on the line.9 
In leveling his attack, however, LoPucki outruns his data and rests on 
assumptions that find little support in today’s Chapter 11 process.  
LoPucki reasons that since there are multiple levels of priority, 
creditors have conflicting interests that prevent them from steering the 
distressed business.10 Their opposing desires can be best mediated by the 
bankruptcy court and the board of directors. Chapter 11 “provides the only 
form of governance practical in the circumstances: a benevolent 
dictatorship of the board as fiduciary and the bankruptcy judge as 
referee.”11  
This analysis falters on fact and on theory. As to fact, Myth errs in 
positing that the board of directors of the bankrupt corporation navigates 
the enterprise through Chapter 11 guided only by its business judgment.12 
LoPucki offers scant detail on his view of what decisions are made in 
today’s Chapter 11 and which players influence these decisions. He 
mentions “investment policy” repeatedly, but does not focus on what 
investment choices are available. He talks about “managers” of the debtor, 
which presumably includes the corporation’s officers and directors, but 
tells us little about to whom they owe allegiance. In fact, directors today 
have little freedom to do as they see fit when the corporation becomes 
 7. The importance of corporate groups is an under-explored aspect of reorganization practice. 
 8. Id. at 1361–64. 
 9. Id. at 1342. 
 10. Id. at 1344–45. 
 11. Id. at 1369. Curiously, while LoPucki extols the virtues of the current regime in this paper, in 
other work and before Congress he has excoriated the same system as being “corrupt.” See, e.g., 
Testimony: Court Competition for Large Ch. 11 Cases, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 53 (2004), WL 23-
SEP AMBKR1J 6 (excerpts of LoPucki’s testimony before Congress); LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING 
FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005). 
 12. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1368. 
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financially vulnerable. Creditors focus unblinkingly on control, and they 
ensure that their interests are at the fore. The method of control may differ 
from case to case, but the overall theme of corporate reorganizations now 
is that senior creditors can ensure that they have the final say over 
decisions that have the potential of adversely affecting their interests.13 
This change in the locus of control has been accompanied by a change in 
the primary decision that dominates most Chapter 11 cases—whether or 
not to sell the business as a whole. The directors may be the ones who 
ultimately vote to auction the business to the highest bidder, but their votes 
are usually guided by the wishes of the senior lenders. We should not 
romanticize directors as the platonic guardians of the corporation. 
As to theory, Myth exaggerates the conflicts among creditors because it 
fails to take account of the fact that priority structure is changed radically 
during the bankruptcy proceeding. Setting to one side the cases where the 
enterprise is sold, and hence there is no issue about governing the 
enterprise after Chapter 11, we do not see the type of conflicts that 
LoPucki posits among residual claimants in negotiations. At the end of the 
case, debt contracts are cancelled and the number of entities that comprise 
the debtor is dramatically reduced. The erstwhile debt holders often 
receive the bulk of their payment in common stock in the newly 
reorganized corporation. As such, their views on the investment policy the 
business should follow while in bankruptcy will reflect the interest that 
they will possess when the enterprise leaves bankruptcy rather than the 
interest that they held at the start of the case. The senior creditor will often 
retain control by receiving a majority of the shares of the reorganization 
company. Regardless of how the shares are distributed, the ability to 
convert debt into equity creates an incentive for the various priority levels 
to maximize the value of the new shares on a going-forward basis. 
This is not to say that negotiations among debtholders are not fierce. 
They are, even between creditors with control and those without it. But 
what is often at stake is not an issue of the course that the business should 
take once it exits Chapter 11; it is an issue of allocating interests in the 
reorganized entity. Valuation is often contested. The parties thus need to 
assign a value to the enterprise. The range of plausible valuations, 
however, implies a range of distributions across priority groups. Changes 
in valuation will change the amount of stock each group receives in the 
 13. For an extended account of corporate governance both before and during bankruptcy, see 
Douglas Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, When Good Managers Go Bad: Controlling Agents of 
Enterprise (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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reorganized entity. It does not, however, change the interest of each group 
to maximize the value of the business. 
Structural priority creates even more room for negotiation. Not only 
must a value for the entire operation be determined, but the constituent 
parts need to be assigned values as well. In addition, substantive 
consolidation, which has the effect of undoing structural priority, can be 
threatened by those who would see the value of their holdings increased 
by lumping all assets and all claims in one pot. Such issues, however, do 
not implicate matters of corporate governance while the enterprise is in 
Chapter 11. In short, parties fight over the allocation of the pie. What they 
do not do, however, is fight over how to increase the size of the pie.14 
The investors in control protect their interests through the normal 
corporate governance structure. They ensure that the directors and the 
management team have their confidence. Turnover here is common. To 
the extent that operational issues need to be addressed, those in control 
ensure that the necessary changes are made. One should not look to the 
extant directors and the judge as the Hercules15 of the bankruptcy process. 
I. THE ROLE OF THE RESIDUAL OWNER 
Control rights have become the central focus in recent bankruptcy 
scholarship.16 This focus has both a positive and a normative dimension. 
On the positive side, the challenge is to understand how these rights are 
 14. More precisely, they do not pursue differing strategies based on differing claims on the future 
cash flows of the business. Even if parties share the same interest in maximizing the overall value of 
the business, they may disagree on which strategy offers the best course for achieving this result. 
 15. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105–06 (1977) (referring to the 
Hercules, and describing him as “a lawyer and judge of superhuman skill, learning, patience, and 
acumen.”). 
 16. Douglas Baird and I have explored the importance of control rights in a series of articles. See 
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 13; Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at 
Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003) [hereinafter Twilight]; Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate 
Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921 (2001); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of 
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002) [hereinafter The End of Bankruptcy]; Douglas G. Baird & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, The Four (or Five) Easy Lessons from Enron, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1787 (2002); 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Secured Credit, Control Rights and Options, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1935 
(2004). We are by no means alone in this emphasis. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The 
“New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 PA. L. REV. 917 (2003); Elizabeth Warren & 
Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 51 (2003), WL 22-SEP 
AMBRK1J 12; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 
(2004); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, The Erosion of Debtor Protections in the Face of 
Expanding Creditors’ Rights and Controls (Sept. 2, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) (presented at Lawrence P. King and Charles Seligson Workshop on Bankruptcy and Business 
Reorganization, New York University). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/6
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currently allocated. There is widespread agreement that creditors, 
especially senior creditors, exercise much control in modern 
reorganization practice.17 On the normative side, the question centers on 
how control rights should be parceled out. LoPucki’s primary target is the 
proposition that bankruptcy law should seek to vest control rights in the 
residual owner.18 He seeks to show that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
identify a single residual owner class in most bankruptcy cases.19 The only 
feasible governance scheme is thus one that vests control rights in the 
board of directors, subject to the loose supervision of the bankruptcy 
judge. 
Before assessing the validity of this argument, one must delineate what 
the fight is all about. There is no dispute as to where law places the legal 
authority to run a corporation; it is in the corporation’s board of 
directors.20 By definition, the authority to act on behalf of the corporation 
rests, in the first instance, with the board of directors. This is the essence 
of the corporate form.21 The board can, of course, devolve this authority on 
others, for example, by giving officers the authority to run the corporation 
on a day-to-day basis, or by signing a contract that constrains its future 
action. 
What is interesting is how this power is exercised. Corporate law 
generally vests the power to elect and remove directors in the 
corporation’s shareholders. Much of the debate in the general corporate 
governance literature centers on the extent to which boards do or should 
maximize the value of the business by attempting to maximize the value of 
the corporation’s stock.22 Once the goal of corporate law is set, attention 
turns to honing the levers of corporate governance. These tools include the 
market for corporate control, the voting rights of shareholders, the 
independence of the board of directors from the CEO, and the structure 
and amount of the CEO’s compensation contract. Some would adjust these 
 17. See generally supra note 16. 
 18. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1342. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). 
 21. The five basic legal characteristics of a corporation are legal personality, limited liability, 
transferable shares, delegated management presided over by a board of directors, and investor 
ownership. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW 1–15 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004). 
 22. The standard account for shareholder maximization is that it increases the value of the 
corporation because all others, including the employees who contribute their human capital and 
consumers who buy from the corporation, can protect themselves via contract. See id. at 17–19. For a 
critique of the shareholder maximization norm, see Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
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mechanisms so as to align the interests of the CEO with those of the 
shareholders; others, while including the interests of shareholders, would 
add the interests of other contributors to the corporation, such as workers.  
Creditors, however, often enter into contracts that give them leverage 
with the board when the corporation stumbles. It is these contracts, not an 
ill-defined legal mandate to maximize the value of the enterprise, that 
often determine how control rights are exercised in Chapter 11. In a 
common scenario, there is a senior creditor that has extensive control. The 
board may be required to obtain the lender’s blessing before it engages in 
a major transaction; indeed, it may need such approval to file a plan of 
reorganization. Alternatively, the senior creditor may ensure that those 
running the business and making the major decisions are those in whom it 
has complete confidence. For example, concurrent with its filing for 
Chapter 11, Interstate Bakeries—the maker of Wonder Bread and 
Twinkies—replaced its long-time CEO with a turn-around specialist who 
often works with lenders.23 The bankruptcy financing for Interstate was 
expressly conditioned on his remaining in place.24 Managers such as this 
are not “benevolent dictators” seeking to advance the interests of all 
stakeholders. Any discussion of bankruptcy governance needs to start 
from this reality. 
The residual owner concept—LoPucki’s target in Myth—is a metric 
used to assess the structure of governance rights in corporations.25 The 
focus on the residual owner stems from agency costs. Such costs arise 
when ownership and control are separated.26 The directors and officers are 
managers, not owners. Hence, their fate is not tied directly to the well-
being of the corporation as a whole. They may take actions that increase 
their security and enhance their own welfare, even though such actions 
may decrease the overall value of the enterprise. Owners, by contrast, are 
those who have their own money on the table. Their pocketbooks guide 
 23. The specialist was Tony Alverez. See Jessica Wohl, Interstate Bakeries Files for Bankruptcy, 
at http://biz.yahoo.com/rbl040922/food_interstate_6.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2004). Baird and I 
discuss Alverez and his involvement in the Interstate Bakeries’ bankruptcy in When Good Managers 
Go Bad: Controlling Agents of Enterprise. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 13. 
 24. Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Exhibit C, Debtor in Possession’s Affirmative Covenant 
(o), In re Interstate Bakeries Corporation, 04-45814-jwv-11 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2004), 
available at www.kccllc.net/ImpdateDocs.asp?FDM=First+ Day+Motions%D=276 (last visited April 
1, 2005). 
 25. This concept is used extensively in corporate law generally. See, e.g., FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 67–70 
(1991); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure, in THE ANATOMY 
OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 21, at 33–34. 
 26. This is the theme of the classic work by Berle and Means. See ADLOF A. BERLE & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/6
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their actions. In Myth, LoPucki implies that only residual owners have 
their money on the line.27 Such is not the case. Simply because an investor 
does not have residual status with regards to certain decisions in Chapter 
11 does not imply that they are indifferent to the fate of the firm. As 
explained below, senior debt often receives equity in a reorganization. As 
potential future equity holders, senior creditors have their money on the 
line. 
Investors thus seek to maximize their return on their investments. A 
sole owner, one who owned the business in full, would have her incentives 
perfectly aligned with that of the business.28 She may hire corrupt or 
incompetent folks to run the business, but such decisions would be made 
out of ineptitude rather than induced by the capital structure of the 
corporation. Once investors hold different instruments, additional agency 
costs arise. When investors have differing claims on the cash flows of the 
corporation, it becomes possible for a corporation to take actions that 
would increase the value of one set of investments but actually decrease 
the value of the corporation.29 
Such a scenario exists where the decision-maker does not bear all of 
the costs and benefits of that decision. For many decisions, it may well be 
that the class of claimants at the end of the line, the class that will get paid 
only if all others are paid first, may be positioned just as well as the sole 
owner. Many decisions affect only the fortunes of the common 
stockholder. Hence, in healthy corporations, shareholders as residual 
claimants are good proxies for a sole owner. This, at least in part, is the 
justification for the proposition that boards should seek to maximize 
shareholder wealth.30 
Things become more complicated as the corporation nears insolvency. 
More and more decisions impact the expected recovery of the holders of 
other investment contracts. As shareholders see the costs of decisions 
 27. Lopucki, supra note 1, at 1342. 
 28. This alignment of incentives applies at least as a first approximation. Risk aversion—the 
desire not to see one’s total worth decrease substantially—may induce even a sole owner to eschew 
strategies that have a positive expected value coupled with a large variance. Also, once the enterprise 
becomes large enough, the sole owner may focus on other matters such as maintaining the company’s 
visibility rather than increasing the value of holdings that already provide her with more than she will 
ever need. 
 29. The classic paper here remains Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 30. Current debates in corporate law scholarship often center on the extent to which alternative 
structures can ensure that those in charge in fact attempt to maximize shareholder value. See, e.g., 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 791 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833 (2005); Blair & Stout, supra note 22. 
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falling on others while the gains largely accrue to them, their incentives 
diverge further and further from that of the corporation as a whole. When 
the corporation becomes insolvent, the shareholders’ gaze narrows to only 
the future benefits. They look for gambles that put them back in the black 
regardless of their costs. At this point, they are playing with the house’s 
money. 
Early academic forays into the governance of a corporation in Chapter 
11 sought to wrest control from shareholders. The operating assumption 
was that the managers and directors in charge of the business remained 
loyal to shareholders.31 Non-bankruptcy law imposes fiduciary duties on 
directors that benefit shareholders.32 The fear was that managers and 
directors that strictly discharged such duties would pursue investment 
policies that were not in the best interest of the business as a whole. The 
rhetoric was to shift the duty so that managers and directors no longer 
owed fealty to shareholders who were out of the money.33 The Delaware 
Chancery Court gave support to such notions, suggesting that in the 
vicinity of insolvency, directors and officers owe a duty to the business as 
a whole. 
Academics also argued that shareholders should forfeit the right they 
have in general corporate law to call a special meeting and replace the 
directors. The fear was that shareholders would install apparatchiks with 
undivided loyalty to shareholder interests.34 Here the case law required 
bankruptcy courts to determine whether to enjoin shareholder meetings on 
a case-by-case basis.  
 31. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 673 (1993) (“Perhaps 
because there is a well-developed body of theory that purports to demonstrate that the managers of 
solvent companies will act in the shareholders’ best interests, most theorists simply assume that the 
same is true for insolvent and reorganizing companies.”). 
 32. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 25. 
 33. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 31, at 768–71; Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A 
New Model of Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 583 (1983); David A. Skeel, Jr., 
The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 
505–13 (1992); see also Alon Chaver & Jesse M. Fried, Managers’ Fiduciary Duty Upon the Firm’s 
Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1813, 1841–44 (2002) (arguing 
that managers should have a fiduciary duty to maximize the total value of all claims against an 
insolvent corporation). But see Laura Linn, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: 
Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1495–1510 (1993) (arguing 
that duty should run to shareholders but that creditors be allowed to contract around that duty). 
 34. See Skeel, supra note 33 (arguing that shareholders should not have the right to call a 
meeting and replace the directors after a corporation has filed for Chapter 11); see also LoPucki & 
Whitford, supra note 31; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 625, 625–28 (1991) (arguing that the rights of shareholders in an insolvent corporation in 
Chapter 11 should be extinguished early in the proceeding). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/6
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Along the same lines, bankruptcy scholars did not trust those at the 
other end of the priority ladder. Those who stood to be paid in full—
usually secured creditors with collateral that exceeded their debts—would 
be too timid. They had nowhere to go but down. The fear of loss would 
lead them to risk little, even if such risks would, on an expected basis, 
increase the value of the corporation. Hence, the proceeding was to be run 
for the benefit of the residual claimant. 
This insight could be deployed in two ways. One is as a yardstick. We 
ascertain which group or groups are in control of the process and then 
compare their incentives to that of a residual owner (or, in an even better 
metric, that of a sole owner). The more those in control have incentives 
that depart from maximizing the overall value of the business, the more we 
look for alternative arrangements. While the efficacy of corporate law’s 
duty of care is a matter of some dispute, at least it should be articulated so 
that it draws the attention of directors and officers to the residual claimant 
and away from the shareholders. When comparing differing arrangements, 
we ask which one is more likely to lead to results that maximize the value 
of the enterprise. LoPucki apparently has no quarrel with this method of 
analysis.35 
A second use of the residual owner concept is more direct. It would 
attempt by law to vest control rights directly in the residual claimants.36 It 
is this use of the residual owner standard that is LoPucki’s focus here.37 He 
maintains that, as a factual proposition, it is difficult to ascertain which 
priority level or indeed levels will have the status of residual owner.38 One 
cannot devolve power on those one cannot identify. 
 35. When Baird and I have invoked the notions of residual owners and sole owners in our other 
work, it has been in this spirit. Part of our project is to ascertain how governance decisions are made in 
financially distressed businesses, and ask whether the changes that we document increase social 
welfare. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 16, at 699 (“We see that fundamental 
forces at work in the economy have made traditional reorganization increasingly obsolete”); Baird & 
Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 16, at 788 (“Chapter 11 can play its traditional role 
only in environments in which specialized assets exist, where those assets must remain in a particular 
firm, where control rights are badly allocated, and where going-concern sales are not possible. Our 
primary focus here has shown that large corporations no longer fit this paradigm.”); Rasmussen, supra 
note 16, at 1948 (“whether or not the lender’s incentives tend to maximize the value of the business is 
thus an empirical question that may differ across corporations”). 
 36. To capture the difference between these two uses, consider the replacement of the board of 
directors during a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The first use would counsel against allowing shareholders to 
call a meeting to install directors that will vigorously attempt to maximize shareholder value. The 
interests of the shareholders are out of whack with the interests of the residual claimants. See LoPucki 
& Whitford, supra note 31, at 768–71; Skeel, supra note 33, at 505–13. The second use would be to 
argue that, as an affirmative matter, the law should vest the replacement power in the creditors. 
 37. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1342. 
 38. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. LOPUCKI’S DATA 
LoPucki has painstakingly compiled a database that includes every 
Chapter 11 filing by a large, publicly-held corporation since the 
Bankruptcy Code took effect.39 He has used it repeatedly to generate novel 
observations, and has generously shared it with others.40 For Myth, he used 
corporations that emerged from bankruptcy between the start of 1991 and 
the end of 1996.41 According to LoPucki’s database, 159 cases ended 
during this period.42 Thirty-five of these cases ended without a company 
emerging from the proceeding.43 Of the remaining 124 cases, 102 filed a 
10-K in the following year.44 In other words, almost two-thirds of the 
corporations in LoPucki’s sample exited Chapter 11 as publicly held 
companies. Of these, LoPucki was able to glean the number of existing 
priority classes in 84 cases, and he was able to obtain information on the 
distribution to these classes in 78 cases.45 
Before summarizing LoPucki’s findings, one further refinement is in 
order, and that is removing prearranged plans of reorganization from the 
cases of emerging corporations that subsequently filed a 10-K. In a 
prearranged plan of reorganization, the contours of the plan are agreed 
upon prior to the bankruptcy filing. Once the basic arrangement is set, the 
case is filed and the plan is voted on and implemented in a relatively short 
time. For the cases in the years that LoPucki examines, the mean number 
of days in Chapter 11 for prearranged bankruptcies is 79, with the median 
being 45.46 This compares with a mean of 718 days (558 median) for the 
other cases disposed of between 1991 and 1996.47  
In these fast-moving prearranged cases, few operational decisions need 
to be made while the corporation is in Chapter 11. To the extent that major 
changes are afoot, they will be made either before or after the Chapter 11 
proceeding, but not during it. To the extent that a quest for residual owners 
 39. See LOPUCKI, supra note 11, at ix. 
 40. Indeed, he wants others to use it so that they can point out inadvertent but inevitable errors 
that creep into a project of this scope. See Bankruptcy Research Database: Frequently Asked 
Questions, at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/ frequently_asked_questions.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2005). 
 41. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1350. 
 42. See Lynn M. LoPucki, WebBRD: Lynn M. LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Database, at 
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/contents_of_the_webbrd.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2005). 
 43. See id.  
 44. See id. Filing a 10-K is probably a good proxy for the corporation being publicly held. 
Corporations with more than $10 million in assets and 500 shareholders must file a 10-K. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
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is at bottom part of an inquiry into optimal governance rules in Chapter 
11, prearranged cases are not a particularly useful place to look. 
Of the 84 cases for which LoPucki can ascertain the number of priority 
levels that existed below secured debt, 30 were prearranged cases.48 Of the 
remaining 54 cases, the median number of priority levels (which includes 
equity interests) remains 4, and mean decreases slightly to 4.2.49 Of the 15 
cases where LoPucki could ascertain that multiple levels of priority were 
created by the issuance of debt by different entities, only two were 
prearranged.50 
Of the 78 cases for which LoPucki has data on distribution in addition 
to priority levels, 26 are prearranged cases.51 Removing these cases 
slightly reduces the number of firms having one or two priority classes 
having residual owner status.52 Replicating LoPucki’s Table 1, which 
reports on the number of priority levels that enjoy residual claimant status 
at the completion of the case, with the prearranged cases removed, we 
get53: 
 
Number of investor 
priority levels sharing 
residual owner status 
Number of firms Percent of firms 
1 18 35% 
2 16 31% 
3 9 17% 
4 5 10% 
5 2 4% 
Over 5 2 4% 
Total 52 100% 
 
 
 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. LoPucki’s calculation as to the extent to which priority is created via corporate 
structure rather than through covenants in debt contracts may well understate the incidence of 
structural priority. LoPucki did not examine the prebankruptcy capital structure of the corporate 
groups in his sample. Rather, he looked at plans of reorganization and counted an enterprise as having 
structural priority only if the plan indicated that different entities in the corporate group had issued 
debt separately. Thus, the most we can say is that LoPucki’s figure of 17% for businesses in his 
sample with structural priority is a lower bound. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. One plausible interpretation of this result is that it is easier to negotiate a new capital 
structure outside of bankruptcy when there are fewer levels of residual claimants. 
 53. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1360. 
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Empirically, LoPucki’s data establishes that large corporate groups 
tend to create multiple levels of priority for their unsecured debt.54 It also 
establishes that when it comes to distributions, in roughly two-thirds of the 
cases there are more than one priority level of unsecured debt that receives 
some distribution but is not paid in full.55 
III. BANKRUPTCY GOVERNANCE 
LoPucki’s finding of multiple priority classes, of which more than one 
often stands to benefit from a marginal increase in the value of the 
enterprise, leads to his normative conclusion. He asserts, quite plausibly, 
that it is usually difficult at the start of the case to ascertain with certainty 
which group (or indeed groups) of claimants will turn out to be the 
residual class.56 Hence, he argues, governance should be left with the 
existing directors and managers, operating the business under the auspices 
of the bankruptcy court.57 
At one level, this prescription is banal. The power to manage a 
corporation is vested in its board of directors, and nothing in the 
Bankruptcy Code divests the board of this authority. In every large 
enterprise, the board delegates to officers the task of running the business, 
reserving for itself the authority to pass on extraordinary matters. For 
LoPucki’s tonic to have bite, he must mean something more than lodging 
formal power in whomever happens to occupy the boardroom and 
executive suite. What I believe he means is that the directors and officers 
in place at the time that bankruptcy is filed must be allowed to exercise 
their best judgment without undue influence by any investor group, be it 
secured creditors, unsecured creditors, shareholders, or employees.58  
As noted earlier, this contrasts with the way in which most cases 
progress today. Senior creditors dominate the landscape in a way that they 
did not a decade ago. My sense is that LoPucki would return us to the 
halcyon days of old where various stakeholders all had input in the 
process. Regardless of whether one can ever go back, or even if one could, 
whether it would have its desired effect,59 LoPucki needs to establish that 
 54. Id. at 1356. 
 55. Id. at 1359. 
 56. Id. at 1345. LoPucki implicitly assumes that differing claims are held by different entities. 
The extent to which this is true is unclear. A vibrant market exists for claims in large bankruptcy cases. 
It may well be that a single entity ends up holding different claims in a Chapter 11 case. 
 57. Id. at 1369. 
 58. Of course, one still needs to supply a definition for “undue.”  
 59. See generally W.W. JACOBS, THE MONKEY’S PAW: A STORY IN THREE SCENES (1937). 
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his vision of corporate governance promises better results than does the 
extant process. The data that he offers in Myth does not carry the burden. 
In evaluating this proposition, I first highlight how the decisions at the 
fore of modern bankruptcy practice today differ from those that dominated 
during the period that LoPucki studied. When we focus on these decisions, 
his data provides no evidence that control rights could be allocated in a 
manner that better advances social welfare. Investment decisions now are 
made by the senior lenders.60 Myth offers no data that suggests that these 
creditors are systematically inclined to make suboptimal decisions as 
compared with other potential decision makers. Even disregarding issues 
of control, to the extent that the residual claimants he finds have conflicts, 
they will not lead to the conflicts over investment policies that he 
supposes. The point is not that the current system is by any means 
perfect.61 We live in a world where optimal results are often elusive. The 
best we can do is compare feasible alternatives. In doing so, we seek to 
determine the extent to which the decisions approximate those that would 
have been made by a sole owner.62 
A. From Negotiation to Sale 
In all empirical projects, one has to be careful in selecting which time 
period to examine. Myth seeks more than to understand the past; it also 
strives to improve the current operation of Chapter 11.63 It examines data 
in the hope of discerning which set of policies will work better today and 
in the future.64 Thus, one has to probe the extent to which the past that 
 60. See Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 16; Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 13. 
 61. On how one would go about answering this question, see Rasmussen, supra note 16. 
 62. In Myth, LoPucki makes two puzzling observations. The first is that Baird and I believe that 
conflicting economic incentives can be safely ignored. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1365. This statement 
is puzzling because, as far as I know, we have never thought that to be the case. Rather, we seek to 
ascertain which parties are exercising control and the extent to which their incentives deviate from the 
goal of maximizing social welfare. The second puzzling observation is that my failure to endorse the 
proposition that the law should vest control rights directly in residual claimants “suggests that at long 
last Freddy is really, finally, dead.” Id. at 1367. The puzzle here is that I have never suggested that 
bankruptcy law be rewritten to somehow put residual claimants “in charge.” That said, it remains 
fruitful to examine the economic incentives of the various contestants in bankruptcy. Some of these 
may be residual claimants, some may not. If LoPucki wants me to banish “residual” from my lexicon, 
I cannot accede. If, however, all he wants is that I refrain from endorsing proposals that would have 
the Bankruptcy Code somehow vest control rights in “residual claimants” in all cases, I am happy to 
do so. 
 63. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1341–43. 
 64. Id.  
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LoPucki has studied bears a resemblance to the current state of affairs, at 
least on the subject that we are exploring.65 
Recent years have seen dramatic changes in Chapter 11 practice. While 
these changes may not affect the number of priority levels of a given 
corporate group, they go the heart of corporate governance in financially 
troubled enterprises.  
Myth is about corporate governance during Chapter 11. The types of 
governance decisions that need to be made in current bankruptcy practice 
differ markedly from those that were at the fore in the early and mid-
1990s. To see this, it is helpful to look quickly at a set comprised of more 
recent cases. LoPucki uses a six-year period beginning at the start of 
1991.66 Taking the most recent six-year period for which LoPucki has data 
(1998-2003) and putting the comparable figures that LoPucki obtains 
using his time period in parentheses, we find that 332 (159) corporate 
groups completed their Chapter 11 proceedings.67 Of these, 175 (124) 
emerged at the completion of the Chapter 11 case.68 Of these 175 (124) 
companies, 41 (102) have filed a 10K.69 Removing prearranged 
bankruptcies from this 41 (102) (for the reasons discussed in Part II),70 we 
are left with 18 (54) companies. Thus, even though more than twice as 
many large, publicly held corporations completed Chapter 11 cases in the 
most recent six-year period as in the period that LoPucki analyzed, the 
number of publicly held corporations that emerge after Chapter 11 has 
decreased by two-thirds. 
What is happening to the Chapter 11 caseload? The dominant fact is 
that the number of sales of firms while in bankruptcy has dramatically 
increased.71 This is not the place to discuss the full import of these changes 
for bankruptcy generally72—the salient point for this response is that when 
discussing the corporate governance of financially embarrassed 
 65. One should not, however, fall victim to the vice of waiting forever as more and more data is 
gathered. It is a question of judgment as to when a policymaker has sufficient data, both in amount and 
in relevance, on which to act. The changes discussed below, however, are of a nature that would make 
it imprudent to prescribe policy based solely on the data in Myth. 
 66. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1350. 
 67. See LoPucki, supra note 42. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. For one company the 10-K is not yet due. 
 70. See infra notes 40–52 and accompanying text. 
 71. For a detailed description of Chapter 11 cases completed in 2002, see Baird & Rasmussen, 
Twilight, supra note 16, at 675–85. 
 72. Douglas Baird and I have engaged with LoPucki on this topic elsewhere. See Baird & 
Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 16; Baird & Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 16; Lynn 
M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird & Rasmussen’s The End of 
Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003). 
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corporations, one needs to focus on the key decisions that have to be 
made. Today, perhaps the most important decision is whether to sell the 
business as a going concern or attempt to negotiate a new capital structure.  
On this score, LoPucki’s data provide no insight into the dynamics that 
lead to the sale of the business. LoPucki asserts that “the existing method 
[of corporate governance] is to impose on the incumbent managers 
fiduciary duties to all parties in interest and leave those managers in 
otherwise unfettered control.”73 This proposition does not arise from his 
database, and it cannot be squared with the landscape of today’s Chapter 
11. Directors of financially distressed corporations have few degrees of 
freedom.74 Lenders are often the ones that insist on a sale.75 The directors 
often cannot take action in Chapter 11 without the blessing of the lenders 
that are providing the financing for the case. Indeed, prior to the filing 
itself, the directors often depend on the lenders not calling a default on the 
outstanding loans. 
The sale of the business as a going concern is an ever-present option in 
today’s environment. We witness companies filing Chapter 11 in order to 
complete a sale to which the company has already agreed. In other cases 
the option of selling the business is selected during the proceeding. Sales 
terminate governance issues, at least as far as bankruptcy is concerned. 
The buyer puts in place its desired governance structure, and the 
bankruptcy proceeding continues with the task of divvying up the 
proceeds. 
Of course, not all cases end in sales. Negotiated reorganizations may 
have declined dramatically, but they have yet to disappear entirely. Often, 
there is not a sale only because the lenders prefer to reconfigure their 
investment in the company rather than to put the company on the block.76  
In attempting to assess the extent to which the incentives of those in 
control correspond with the goal of maximizing social welfare, the 
benchmark remains the actions of the sole owner. In a world where we see 
creditor control throughout the bankruptcy process and with a sale of the 
 73. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1341. 
 74. For an extended discussion of how lenders obtain and exercise control of financially 
distressed corporations, see Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 13. 
 75. Not always, though. For example, in Adelphia’s Chapter 11 proceeding, it was the 
shareholders who pushed for a sale. The salient point, however, is that a sale of the business is usually 
a serious option in most reorganizations of the size that LoPucki tracks. 
 76. For an argument that an auction may not be the value-maximizing course of action in every 
Chapter 11 cases, see Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A 
Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (1992). 
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business an ever-present option, what insight do LoPucki’s findings on the 
existence of multiple priority levels provide? 
B. To Sell or Not to Sell 
The alternative to selling the business is to put a new capital structure 
in place and continue with the business, perhaps with a new business 
model. The decision whether or not to sell will depend in part on the 
dynamics of the expected negotiations that would otherwise take place. To 
the extent that one group decides that it would fare better under a sale 
rather than a reorganization, it will push for placing the enterprise on the 
block. To the extent that a group believes that it would capture more in a 
reorganization, it will raise objections to the sale. When one group is in 
control of the reorganization effort, its incentives are the ones that matter 
most. Thus, we need to ask the extent to which LoPucki’s findings suggest 
a skewing toward the negotiations for a new capital structure or the sale 
decision. 
1. Conflicts in Negotiations 
Myth worries about the conflicts of interest that exist when the parties 
seek to reorganize the business.77 Consider the primary conflict that 
LoPucki focuses on in Myth: the conflict in investment policy when the 
corporation is not being sold.78 LoPucki’s basic argument runs as follows: 
(1) Corporate groups create multiple priority levels within their unsecured 
debt; (2) at the time that the groups file for bankruptcy, it is often the case 
that more than one of these priority levels is a residual claimant in that 
they stand to receive some but less than full repayment; (3) governance of 
the enterprise cannot be entrusted to the residual claimant both because it 
is difficult to predict at the commencement of the case which groups will 
have residual status during and at the end of the case, and because the 
competing priority levels have interests that conflict.79  
Take the last step first. It is central to LoPucki’s argument80 that there 
are conflicts among priority levels, and that these conflicts imply that the 
residual claimants—even if we can identify them—are ill-suited to 
exercise control over the operations of the enterprise. However, it is 
 77. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1344–45. 
 78. See id. at 1350. 
 79. See id. at 1343–49. 
 80. Id. at 1344–45. 
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important to specify the conflicts that exist among these investors. 
LoPucki extends the standard conflict that exists between debt and equity 
to the case where unsecured debt is parceled out among different priority 
levels.81 All things being equal, those lower on the priority hierarchy 
prefer projects with high variance because they capture all the upside and 
much of the downside falls on the more senior investors, and those who 
rank high in terms of priority have the opposite preference.82 The conflict 
arises because differing investors hold different claims on the cash flow of 
the enterprise. Thus, in the case of more than one residual claimant, those 
claimants that are paid in full or nearly so will seek low variance projects, 
while those receiving less will seek out high variance projects. This 
conflict over project choice renders the residual claimants incapable of 
speaking with a unified voice. 
The problem for LoPucki’s argument is that conflict disappears (or at 
least is greatly reduced) by the end of the bankruptcy proceeding. 
LoPucki’s findings place a dollar value on all recoveries. He does not 
explore the actual instruments the old claimants receive in the reorganized 
entity. In fact, residual claimants tend to be paid in stock.83 Consider, for 
example, the plan of reorganization in In re Envirodyne,84 one of the 
Chapter 11 cases that ended during the time period that LoPucki analyzed. 
The debtor had three issues of debt with differing priority levels.85 The 
first level, the senior discount notes, was in the money.86 The plan of 
reorganization replaced the old notes with new notes of equal value.87 The 
middle tranche, a senior subordinated debenture that paid 14% interest, 
had a face value of $200 million.88 These claimants saw their notes 
cancelled, and instead received common stock that the plan valued at $121 
million.89 The most junior of the bond holders, the subordinated notes, 
were owed $100 million.90 The plan provided that they would receive $20 
 81. Id. at 1356. 
 82. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 29. 
 83. While I do not have comprehensive data on the capital structure of emerging corporations, I 
am comfortable with the above assertion for two reasons. First, I have followed the reorganization 
plans and spoken with a number of attorneys over the past few years. The plans that I have seen and 
the attorneys that I have spoken with had me to the definite conclusion that junior debtholders tend to 
receive the bulk of their distribution in equity. Second, given that we are talking about the residual 
claimants, it is highly plausible that they are paid in junior securities. 
 84. In the Matter of Envirodyne Industries, Inc., 29 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 85. Id. at 303. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
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million in stock of the new company.91 These last two groups are both 
residual claimants in the sense that neither is being paid in full. But do 
they have differing interests on issues of corporate governance? 
After the case is over, both groups of erstwhile debtholders will be 
shareholders. At that time, they want to maximize the value of equity. If 
the parties anticipate that they will have the same type of interest in the 
reorganized corporation immediately after the Chapter 11 proceeding is 
complete, one would expect that they would work together during the 
proceeding to ensure that that interest is worth as much as possible. The 
conflict that LoPucki posits evaporates. 
This should not be surprising. The various investors in Chapter 11 have 
an opportunity to put in place a capital structure that makes sense for the 
reorganized business. Indeed, Chapter 11 is designed to remove 
impediments that exist outside of bankruptcy that make it difficult for 
corporations with excessive debt levels to reduce that debt. One would 
expect that, during the bankruptcy proceeding, the parties would seek to 
implement a capital structure that maximized the value of the business. 
There is no doubt that each party wants to maximize its own investment. 
But, at least as an initial matter, the more a corporation is worth, the more 
the various investors stand to receive. 
To be sure, the issue of a debtor’s capital structure as it exits 
bankruptcy is underdeveloped. Corporations that leave bankruptcy have 
debt as well as equity.92 While important scholarship was done looking at 
the capital structure of businesses that emerged from bankruptcy 20 years 
ago,93 I am unaware of more recent studies on this score.94 Similarly, little 
or no work exists on the exit financing that a corporation often procures in 
order to consummate its plan of reorganization. As we see in the United 
Airlines bankruptcy, the need to procure exit financing casts a long 
shadow on the reorganization. Still, it is generally the case that 
 91. Id. 
 92. Some all-equity corporations do emerge. These corporations tend to have no assets other than 
the prior entity’s tax-loss-carryforwards. See Gilson, infra note 93, at 178–79. 
 93. The best papers here are Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: 
Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 (1997), and LoPucki & Whitford, supra 
note 31. Both papers use cases from a time period earlier than the one used in Myth. 
 94. The businesses that emerged during the 1980s tended to be more highly-leveraged than 
competitors in their industry. Depending on the metric used, firms leaving bankruptcy at that time had 
leverage greater than the industry average approximately two-thirds and three-fourths of the time. See 
Gilson, supra note 93, at 166 (reporting that 65.5% of the corporations in his study had a leverage ratio 
greater than the industry median); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 607 (1993) 
(reporting a 76% figure). This higher leverage, however, may reflect the optimal capital structure for 
these businesses. Gilson, supra note 93, at 182–83. 
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corporations that leave bankruptcy via reorganization have both debt and 
equity. 
In reorganizations where the senior lenders are in control, the fact that 
the reorganized corporation has both debt and equity provides some 
insight into whether the use of this control tends to maximize the value of 
the business. The senior creditors receive debt in the reorganized 
corporation, albeit in a lower amount than what they were originally owed, 
along with equity. There are some projects that they would forgo as 
holders of both debt and equity that equity holders would find attractive. 
While potential conflicts over investment policy are not eliminated 
completely—one can always find an agency cost if one looks hard 
enough—they are greatly reduced by the expectation that the dominant 
player expects to have both a debt and an equity interest in the reorganized 
company. Indeed, a holder of debt and equity may have incentives that are 
closer to those of a sole owner than are the incentives of one who holds 
only debt or only equity. 
This congruity of interests concerning the future operations of the 
enterprise does not mean that differing priority classes do not engage in 
quarrels. Given that these claims are not going to be paid in full, and the 
fact that equity is going to be distributed, valuation disputes are often 
heated. The fact that senior lenders may be exercising control over the 
deployment of the debtor’s assets does not to ameliorate this conflict. A 
low valuation of the business will leave more stock in the hands of the 
more senior claimants, while a higher valuation will increase the amount 
that goes to the junior class. To illustrate, consider LoPucki’s example 
with three creditors each owed $100 and the investment contracts provide 
that one creditor (C) will subordinate its debt to the debt of another 
creditor (A).95 LoPucki posits that the business is worth $132, with 
Creditor A getting $88 by virtue of the subordination agreement with 
Creditor C, Creditor B getting its pro rata share of $44, and Creditor C 
receiving nothing.96 These creditors are likely to take their return in shares, 
rather than in cash or debt instruments.  
Assume that the reorganized corporation is going to distribute 100 
shares of stock: if all agree that the value of the corporation is $132, 
Creditor A will receive 67 shares and Creditor B 33 shares and Creditor C 
would receive no distribution. But what if a value of $177 were assigned 
to the reorganized entity? As to the division of this value, Creditor A 
 95. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1358. 
 96. Id.  
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would be paid in stock worth $100, Creditor B in stock worth $59, and 
Creditor C in stock worth $18. Assuming the same 100 shares to 
distribute, Creditor A would now get 56 shares, Creditor B would still 
receive 33 shares, and Creditor C would recover 11 shares. Creditor A 
would thus have an incentive to argue for the $132 valuation, which would 
provide it with two-thirds of the equity in the reorganized corporation, 
while Creditor C would press for the $177 figure, which would allow it to 
receive 11% of the new stock.97 
But Creditors A, B, and C have no dispute over how to operate the 
business. Regardless of which valuation is selected, they will each hold 
stock in the new company. Once Chapter 11 is complete and the new 
securities are issued, their interests are perfectly aligned. In terms of 
governing the corporation, these differing investors have the same interest. 
The discussions spurred by the possibility of substantive consolidation 
exhibit a similar pattern. As LoPucki demonstrates,98 at times, multiple 
residual claimants result from structural priority. Not only does structural 
priority create valuation conflicts similar to that just discussed—each party 
has an incentive to press for an aggressive valuation of its entity and a 
stingy valuation of the other constituents of the corporate group—but also 
the class that holds claims against a relatively low-asset entity can press 
for substantive consolidation.99 Consider in this vein the recent WorldCom 
bankruptcy. MCI, prior to its being taken over by WorldCom in a stock 
merger, issued debt on an unsecured basis.100 WorldCom then acquired the 
stock of MCI. This acquisition had no affect on the rights that the MCI 
debt holders had against the MCI assets. MCI’s initial plan of 
reorganization sought to substantively consolidate the MCI debt and the 
 97. A sale would terminate the valuation dispute, but I am assuming for the moment that the 
investors would find it in their interest to not put the enterprise on the market. 
 98. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1361–64. 
 99. The extent of substantive consolidation in bankruptcy is yet another area we do not 
understand as well as we should. The case law on substantive consolidation sets forth a high threshold, 
but it is unclear the extent to which substantive consolidation happens in practice. See, e.g., In re 
Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). Indeed, LoPucki finds structural priority by looking at distributions in confirmed 
plans. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1361. To the extent that substantive consolidation occurs, this could 
result in LoPucki underreporting the number of firms that had structural priority when they entered 
Chapter 11. 
 100. This debt can come in different flavors, including QUIPS, which are a form of subordinated 
debt just on the debt side of preferred stock. On the ability to craft instruments that have many of the 
economic features of equity but the tax status of debt, see Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can 
Optimal Commodity Tax Methodology Save the Debt-Equity Distinction?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 859 
(2002). 
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WorldCom debt.101 WorldCom argued that there had been over $380 
billion in transfers among related entities, and the cost of unscrambling the 
omelet was too high.102 MCI debtholders bitterly objected and sought to 
derail the plan of reorganization.103 Ultimately an agreement was reached, 
with the MCI holders receiving 80 cents on the dollar and the WorldCom 
bondholders receiving a 36% payout.104 
Structural priority here led to intense conflict on the issue of 
substantive consolidation. What it did not do, however, was lead to dispute 
over which investment policy the reorganized MCI should follow. 
2. Conflicts in Sales 
To the extent that agency costs inherent in multiple levels of debt are 
dampened in those cases where the debtor leaves Chapter 11 with a new 
capital structure hammered out during the proceedings, this still leaves for 
consideration the largest issue in bankruptcy governance today. Should the 
business be sold? Do the multiple levels of residual claimants that LoPucki 
documents suggest that this decision is riddled with agency conflicts? 
The standard account of Chapter 11 recognizes that shareholders prefer 
a reorganization that preserves the option value of their shares for sale.105 
A sale would yield insufficient funds to give the shareholders a dime, but a 
reorganization allows them to maneuver in ways that would allow them to 
retain some interest in the reorganized corporation. Today’s Chapter 11, 
however, frequently cancels the shareholder interests in full. The 
underlying concern, however, remains. Rent extraction by shareholders 
may have been replaced by rent extraction by unsecured creditors. In 
theory, the residual claimants that LoPucki unearths could press for a 
negotiated settlement when a sale would be quicker and cheaper. To the 
extent that these claimants could use the process to systematically receive 
equity that overcompensates them based on their pre-petition claims, they 
 101. See Randall L. Klein & Dmitri G. Karcazes, Kmart, WorldCom & Adelphia, Mega-Issues 
from Mega-Cases, ABF J., Oct. 2003, at 18. 
 102. See Debtors’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Substantive Consolidation and in 
Opposition to Objections Thereto, In re World Com, OZ-13533 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 
2003), available at www.elawforworldcom.com. 
 103. See Klein & Karcazes, supra note 101, at 3. 
 104. The MCI claimants were given new notes, and the WorldCom bondholders were allowed to 
choose between new notes or shares of common stock in the reorganized corporation. See Debtors’ 
Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re WorldCom, 02-135233 
(AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003), available at www.elawforworldcom.com. 
 105. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment 
of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in 
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 107 (1984). 
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would seek to do so. But we have no evidence that such pressures are at 
work today.106 Indeed, we see cases where the junior creditors pass for a 
sale, fearful that a reorganization will place too low a value on the 
enterprise. To the extent that residual claimants expect to receive the fair 
value of their investments in either a sale or a negotiation over a new 
capital structure, they will not have a systematic preference to pursue one 
path over another based on their status as residual claimants. This is true 
regardless of whether there is one group that can lay claim to residual 
claimant status, or three or four. 
LoPucki’s primary argument in Myth supporting his prescription for 
corporate governance thus fails. The conflicts central to his account do not 
loom large. Yet this does not mean that other arguments for his vision of 
corporate governance while in bankruptcy do not exist. Indeed, LoPucki 
has elsewhere set forth a sustained case for his conception of how 
businesses should be run while in bankruptcy.107 This is not the place for a 
detailed analysis of this proposition (for one thing, offering such an 
argument would lead to the cardinal sin of a comment being longer than 
the piece to which it is responding!). Nevertheless, I want to offer two 
brief thoughts.  
The first is that the empirical evidence we have from corporate 
governance generally suggests that boards that are secure in their tenure 
underperform their peers. The evidence comes from research on the 
impact of staggered boards on corporate performance. Staggered boards 
effectively immunize a board from a hostile takeover.108 The defenders of 
this structure, in tones that resonate with those of LoPucki, argue that the 
directors can run the company better if they are freed from short-term 
pressures.109 Recent empirical work, however, demonstrates that these 
 106. The fact that the residual claimants would be shareholders in a corporation with debt if there 
is no sale does not imply that they would favor that outcome. To be sure, once they hold the stock, 
they may seek investment projects that place risk on the debtholders. But the debtholders themselves 
often end up with a controlling interest in the reorganized business. There is little chance in the near 
term for shenanigans aimed at expropriating debtholder wealth. Moreover, the amount of the debt and 
its interest rate are set at the same time as the shares are issued. Any residual ability the new 
shareholders have to grab value will be priced in the debt.  
 107. See Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. 
L. REV. 741 (2004). 
 108. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002). 
 109. See, e.g., Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 819, 830 (2002) (“Takeover defenses serve legitimate and useful purposes, including providing a 
company time and leverage to negotiate a better deal or find a better alternative, rebuff an inadequate 
or opportunistically timed bid, or remain independent and pursue its long-term business strategy—if 
the board determines that doing any of those things is in the best interests of the shareholders.”) 
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boards reduce firm value by 3-4% on average.110 While it would be a 
mistake to translate these findings to the environs of the bankruptcy court 
without scrutiny, they do suggest that boards may respond better when 
they are not insulated from various forces. Indeed, the extent to which 
creditors go to great lengths to ensure that they have control of the 
bankruptcy process suggests that they recognize the costs that can be 
incurred when directors are not attuned to those with money on the line.  
The second point is one framing the debate going forward. To 
understand the dynamics of modern corporate reorganizations, we have to 
do more than identify which actor exercises formal legal authority. We 
need to understand who these actors are and what factors shape their 
decisions. As to the identity of those who sit on a debtor’s board of 
directors, we see that boards in bankruptcy undergo dramatic turnover. 
When Baird and I looked at firms that emerged via a reorganization rather 
than a sale in 2002, we found that in a majority of cases a new board of 
directors is appointed during the bankruptcy process.111 Indeed, plans of 
reorganization sometimes give appointment power to specific groups of 
investors.112 Considering who appoints the board members provides 
insights into how the board will exercise its powers. Before assessing 
whether current practice is normatively desirable, we need a better 
understanding of the dynamics that guide the corporate decisions of 
enterprises that are in financial distress, and what alternatives are 
available. 
To this end, there are a host of questions that could shed light on 
current practice: Which creditors have control? What alternative choices 
do they face? To what extent do they have incentives to exercise their 
control in a way that fails to maximize the value of the enterprise? Is there 
a viable alternative that we could expect to do better?113 In other words, 
does corporate governance in Chapter 11 today benefit the residual owner?  
 110. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards (June 2004) 
(Harvard Discussion Paper No. 478). 
 111. See Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 16, at 697–98. 
 112. See id. at 698. 
 113. Barry Adler and David Skeel have both raised thoughtful concerns on the ways in which 
creditor control could fail to maximize the value of the business. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy 
Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 219, 226–32 (2004); see generally Skeel, supra note 16, at 
917. 
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CONCLUSION 
Academics fancy elegant solutions. Finding the one group that offers 
the best chance to address the problems of the financially embarrassed 
firm is an inviting target. Locate Hercules, be it in the residual claimant, 
the board of directors, the creditors or the bankruptcy judge, and let him 
do the rest. The world as we find it is always going to be more complex. 
This complexity, however, does not doom the enterprise. Those businesses 
that emerge from Chapter 11 have new capital structures and governance 
structures that are either the product of negotiations among sophisticated 
parties or imposed on the corporation by an entity that has bought the 
business. LoPucki has added to our understanding of the capital structures 
of corporate groups that enter Chapter 11. What he has failed to do, 
however, is to demonstrate that the law can improve on the way decisions 
are made today. Many questions, however, remain open, and we need to 
continue efforts to explore the exercise of control rights before, during, 
and after Chapter 11. I have no doubt that LoPucki will be one who 
continues to be a leader in our efforts to better understand the workings of 
corporate reorganization practice. 
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